Resumen de: US20260197159A1
A quantum security method, including: determining a session key; utilizing a hash function to process the session key to obtain a first string; combining the first string, a second string and a third string into a combined string; transmitting the combined string through at least one basis to generate a first single photon sequence, and transmitting the first single photon sequence to the receiver through a quantum channel; receiving the first single photon sequence and measuring the first string and the second string through the at least one basis to obtain a first return string and a second return string respectively, and transmitting a second single photon sequence; verifying the first return string, the second return string and a third return string sequentially to obtain a first verification result; and utilizing the hash function to verify the session key to obtain a second verification result.
Resumen de: US20260195406A1
A hierarchical activation-broadcast network for column-oriented neural-network compute arrays is disclosed. Activation values corresponding to each processing row are distributed concurrently to all columns of processing elements through a hierarchical latch tree that fans out the signals synchronized within one clock period. The broadcast network maintains precise timing alignment among columns while minimizing capacitive loading and clock skew. The distribution fabric may be fabricated on a separate die or interposer and connected to the compute die by high-density hybrid bonds. The approach enables wide, low-skew activation delivery across large arrays, reducing energy consumption and improving frequency scalability for CASCADE architectures.
Resumen de: US20260197160A1
0000 A computer-implemented Universal Quantum Access Key (UQAK) system provides quantum-secure identity authentication, policy-controlled authorization, domain-namespace routing, and interoperable settlement. A namespace resolver resolves a human-readable identifier, parcel identifier, subdomain identifier, or basepoint identifier to a signed endpoint record. An identity module authenticates a subject identity anchor. An event-ingestion module receives a digitally signed event record, transaction request, evidence commitment, or terminal-originated payment event. A Time-Proof engine binds the event to a time reference, validity window, and anti-replay value. A policy container loads a signed, versioned policy bundle or PackSet. A transaction authorization and minting engine executes a single atomic state transition that authorizes a protected action, binds an associated token, value unit, certificate, entitlement, or authorization state, generates a decision or mint receipt, and anchors a digest in a tamper-evident data structure. A clearing and settlement module generates a settlement receipt.
Resumen de: US20260197161A1
Techniques for securing a digital ecosystem are disclosed. In embodiments, a method includes storing a master QNA object comprising s symmetric matrices, each having d rows. The master QNA is structured to allocate correlated QNA objects to cohorts of the digital ecosystem based on credentials of the cohorts. The method includes receiving a unique identifier of a cohort being admitted to the ecosystem; determining a set of s selection values based on the unique identifier of the new digital cohort and a selection function; and allocating a new QNA object comprising s vectors to the cohort based on the s selection values and the s matrices. Each selection value is between 1 and d and corresponds to a respective composite matrix of the s composite matrices such that each selection value indicates a specific row of the respective matrix to which the selection value corresponds.
Resumen de: US20260197637A1
The present disclosure relates to a 5G communication system or a 6G communication system for supporting higher data rates beyond a 4G communication system such as long term evolution (LTE). Embodiments disclosed herein relate to methods and systems for selecting a security profile in communication network. More specifically, embodiments disclosed herein relate to methods (500, 900, 2100) and systems (200) to perform a security profile selection procedure for wireless communication networks. The proposed method (500, 900, 2100) provides Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) or quantum cryptography based security profile selection in wireless communication networks. The method (500, 900, 2100) discloses a plurality of post quantum based security profiles in User Equipment (UE) (202), mechanisms and procedures involved in selection of security profiles, which are mainly used in maintaining subscriber privacy during primary authentication procedure between the UE (202) and the communication network (204). The selected security profiles can be further used for data encryption between the UE (202) and the communication network (204). The mechanism dynamically selects the security profile that can provide better security in a given network environment.
Resumen de: EP4485842A1
The present invention relates to a QKD communication method between a first node A and a second node B through at least one intermediary node T, comprising the steps of generating, at the first node A, a key K, which is symmetrically encrypted using a key K' to create a resulting encrypted key m, encrypting, at the first node A, said message m with a key K1 and sending this encrypted message as well as K1 to said intermediary node T, decrypting, at said intermediary node T, the message sent from said first node A with K1 to obtain m and then OTP-encrypting said message m with a key K2 and sending this encrypted message as well as the key K2 to said second node B, and decrypting, at the second Node B, the message sent from T with K2 to obtain m and symmetrically decrypts m with the key K' to recover the key K, characterized in that K' is obtained by the steps of generating, at the first node A, a key K' and a message m' to be sent to the second node B, sending the message m' to the at least one intermediary node T via a classical communication channel, which in turn forwards it to the second node B, and obtaining, at the second node, the key K' by using a private key and the message m'.
Resumen de: EP4773543A1
According to an arrangement, a QKD device (2) includes a detection unit (21), a monitoring unit (24), and a switching control unit (25). The detection unit (21) is configured to detect a quantum signal by photons transmitted from a transmitting quantum key distribution (QKD) device. The monitoring unit (24) is configured to monitor monitoring information including a parameter based on the quantum signal. The switching control unit (25) is configured to transmit, to the transmitting QKD device (1), a switching signal for switching from a normal mode to a debug mode for enhancing intensity of the quantum signal by a predetermined value, based on the monitoring information.
Resumen de: US20260187252A1
Conventional risk estimation techniques perform dynamic analysis of application or use models which require training data. Present disclosure provides method and system to estimate risk for a software application due to quantum threat by static analysis. A set of records pertaining to the application is received and parsed to obtain application, crypto and platform parameters. In addition, list of quantum vulnerable algorithms, number of Qubits required to break a cryptographic algorithm used by the application and a current Qubit number are also received. Then, value of Quantum Day is determined based on the current Qubit number and the number of Qubits required to break the cryptographic algorithm used by the application. Further, SOD (Severity, Occurrence, Detection) scores are calculated for each parameter, and they are multiplied to determine Risk Priority Number (RPN) for each parameter. Finally, RPNs of all parameters are summed up to estimate overall risk of the application.
Resumen de: US20260189374A1
0000 The present invention proposes a computer implemented method and system for determining a cryptographic key. The method comprises constructing a tensor network with parameters representing a candidate cryptographic key; adjusting the parameters of the tensor network; generating a candidate key sample and obtaining a candidate ciphertext obtained with the candidate cryptographic key; calculating a cost function with respect to a target ciphertext, measuring an overlap between the target ciphertext and the candidate ciphertext, determining whether the overlap has reached a threshold value. If threshold value is not reached, repeating the method by further adjusting the parameters of the tensor network, if the threshold value is reached, determining that the candidate cryptographic key is the cryptographic key.
Resumen de: US20260189377A1
0000 A method may include: a third-party receiving a claimed position from a prover; the third-party and the prover exchanging quantum information; the third-party generating a third-party raw key based on the quantum information; the prover generating a prover raw key based on the quantum information; the third-party and the prover performing classical post-processing based on the raw keys; the third-party sending, a position verification request with the claimed position to a first verifier and a second verifier; the first verifier and the second verifier sending classical messages and a quantum system to the prover to arrive at a target time; the prover measuring the quantum system using the classical messages; the prover sending responses to the verifiers; the verifiers validating the responses and confirming that the responses were received within an expected time window; and the first verifier informing the third-party of a result of the validation.
Resumen de: US20260189373A1
A method includes providing a shared secret data to a device and also to a security service; using the provided shared secret data to provide a root key; and using the root key as a basis for a sequence of stages, wherein each stage comprises an operation which converts a start key into a different generated key, and the same stages are carried out in parallel at the device and at the security service. The root key is used as the start key for a first stage of the sequence, and a generated key produced by each stage of the sequence, except for the final stage of the sequence, is used as a start key for a next stage of the sequence. The keys produced by the last sequence stage at the device and at the security service are used to authenticate the device to the security service.
Resumen de: US20260189388A1
The present disclosure relates to a quantum communication system. Particularly, the present disclosure relates to a device and a method for performing quantum state modulation based on quantum authentication in a quantum communication system.
Resumen de: EP4770003A1
Verwendung eines Neutrino-Detektors als vertrauenswürdiger Knoten (Trusted Node) in einem Verfahren zum kryptographischen Schlüsselaustausch zwischen einem ersten Kommunikationsendpunkt und einem zweiten Kommunikationsendpunkt, wobei der Neutrino-Detektor:- über einen ersten Neutrino-basierten Kommunikationskanal einen ersten kryptographischen Schlüssel von dem ersten Kommunikationsendpunkt empfängt,- über einen zweiten Neutrino-basierten Kommunikationskanal einen zweiten kryptographischen Schlüssel von dem zweiten Kommunikationsendpunkt empfängt,- die beiden kryptographischen Schlüssel in einem Schlüsselspeicher speichert,- über einen öffentlichen Kommunikationskanal eine am ersten Kommunikationsendpunkt erzeugte Zufallszahl (RND) empfängt, die unter Verwendung des ersten kryptographischen Schlüssels verschlüsselt ist,- die Zufallszahl (RND) unter Verwendung des gespeicherten ersten kryptographischen Schlüssels entschlüsselt und- die entschlüsselte Zufallszahl (RND) unter Verwendung des im Schlüsselspeicher gespeicherten zweiten kryptographischen Schlüssels verschlüsselt und über einen öffentlichen Kommunikationskanal an den zweiten Kommunikationsendpunkt sendet, um dem zweiten Kommunikationsendpunkt die Rekonstruktion der Zufallszahl (RND) unter Verwendung des ihm bekannten zweiten kryptographischen Schlüssels zu ermöglichen, sodass dem ersten und dem zweiten Kommunikationsendpunkt eine gemeinsame Zufallszahl (RND) als kryptographischer Schlüssel z
Resumen de: EP4770002A1
Verfahren zum Austausch eines kryptografischen Schlüssels zwischen einem Sender und einem Empfänger unter Verwendung eines Neutrino-basierten Kommunikationskanals, umfassend die Schritte:Senderseitige Erzeugung eines Neutrino-Strahls durch:- Beschleunigen von Protonen in einem Protonenstrahl,- Auslenkung des Protonenstrahls auf ein Target zur Erzeugung von Neutrinos durch den Zerfall kurzlebiger Teilchen;Senderseitige Generierung einer Folge von Zufallsbits, die den kryptografischen Schlüssel repräsentiert, und Kodierung der Zufallsbits durch:- Steuerung der Auslenkung des Protonenstrahls mittels eines steuerbaren Ablenksystems, um entsprechend der Zufallsbits den Protonenstrahl entweder auf das Target oder auf einen Absorber zu lenken, wodurch die Zufallsbits als Neutrino-Pulse kodiert werden;Übertragung der Neutrino-Pulse vom Sender zum Empfänger;Synchronisierung von Sender und Empfänger mittels einer Zeitsynchronisationseinheit, die die Taktung der erzeugten Neutrino-Pulse mit Zeitfenstern des Empfängersystems synchronisiert;Empfang der Neutrino-Pulse durch einen Neutrino-Detektor des Empfängers, wobei:- Zerfallsprodukte, insbesondere Lichtsignale, die bei der Wechselwirkung der Neutrinos mit einem Detektormedium erzeugt werden, detektiert werden und- die detektierten Signale jeweils einem Schlüsselbit zugeordnet werden;Speicherung und Aneinanderreihung der empfangenen Schlüsselbits zur Erzeugung des kryptografischen Schlüssels, der in einem Schlüsselspeicherm
Resumen de: WO2026135455A1
This disclosure pertains to a method for real-time state-validation of entanglement between at least two independent distant quantum nodes in an extendible quantum network. Each quantum node comprises at least a communication qubit. The quantum network comprises a midpoint, comprising a measurement apparatus for measuring a herald in a quantum signal, and a digital logic unit for calculating the measurement result. The method comprises the steps of receiving a hybrid signal comprising a quantum signal and a classical signal; measuring, each of the quantum signals to validate entanglement; validating the entanglement based on the outcome of the measurement and on the state-validation information of the classical signal; sending a classical message about the validation of the entanglement attempt.
Resumen de: US20260180794A1
0000 One or more embodiments address the transition to Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) within secure element hardware environments. The embodiments focus on key management solutions for resource-constrained devices running JAVA CARD or similar platforms. PQC implementations face challenges from large key sizes that strain secure element resources, including RAM, ROM, flash memory, input/output bandwidth, and processing capabilities. The embodiments present methods for handling PQC keys through importation, exportation, generation, storage, utilization, and protection operations. The implementation manifests as an Application Programming Interface (API) that enables applications to leverage key management capabilities efficiently within secure element resource constraints. The API delivers advantages through memory optimization using flexible condensation and derivation mechanisms. Security benefits emerge from integrating key operations within the certified platform environment, enabling hardware acceleration and side-channel attack countermeasures through native code implementation.
Resumen de: WO2026132391A1
Methods and systems are disclosed for synchronising a first block of quantum key material in a first QKD node with a second QKD node. The first QKD node and the second QKD node share a quantum key material generator. The method comprises ingesting, by the first QKD node, the first block of quantum key material from the quantum key material generator and storing, by the first QKD node, the first block of quantum key material in association with a first state of a first finite-state machine. The first state of the first finite-state machine may indicate that the first block of quantum key material has not been synchronised. The method further comprises sending, by the first QKD node, a synchronisation request to the second QKD node and associating the first block of quantum key material with a second state of the first finite-state machine. The synchronisation request identifies the first block of quantum key material. The second state of the first finite-state machine may indicate that the first block of quantum key material is in a process of being synchronised. The method further comprises in dependence on a response being received, by the first QKD node, from the second QKD node, associating the first block of quantum key material with an updated state of the first finite-state machine.
Resumen de: US20260180791A1
Out-of-band quantum key distribution using cellular SMS can include receiving, from a user device, a client identifier that identifies the user device and a first key identifier that identifies a first key having a first key value that is a first quantumly generated random bit string. A second key that includes a second key value can be requested and received from the key service, the second key value including a second quantumly generated random bit string. The second key value can be provided to a short message service center for delivery to the user device. An operation can be performed on the first key value and the second key value to obtain a copy of a pre-shared key, which can be used when exchanging encrypted communications with the user device.
Resumen de: US20260178754A1
A method of enabling custom cryptography is provided. The method can include sending, by a first computing device and to a second computing device, instructions to initiate a proxy. The proxy can be configured to intercept a message of a user agent. The user agent may be associated with the second computing device. The proxy can be further configured to perform custom cryptography based on the message to obtain a modified message. The custom cryptography may comprise post-quantum cryptography. The proxy can be further configured to send the modified message to at least one of the user agent, a reverse proxy, or a third computing device. The post-quantum custom encryption and/or decryption can comprise Quantum Secure Layer (QSL), Post-Quantum Transport Layer Security (PQTLS), Kyber, SABER, Enhanced McEliece, RLCE, or a National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) candidate post-quantum algorithm.
Resumen de: US20260180790A1
Provided here is a computer-implemented method, system and computing device for agreeing a final symmetric key between a first party and a second party, wherein the first party is configured to communicate with the second party, the method comprising: retrieving a plurality of key exchange algorithms or key encapsulation mechanisms wherein the plurality of key exchange algorithms or key encapsulation mechanisms are each different; agreeing a set of keys using the plurality of key exchange algorithms or key encapsulation mechanisms; using the agreed set of keys to obtain a final symmetric key, according to a combination scheme that specifies how each key of the set of keys is to be used to obtain the final symmetric key; and storing the final symmetric key at the first and second party.
Resumen de: GB2632664A
A pair of pulses, of differing phase but identical polarisation, are generated 126, 127. The pulse pair is passed through a polarisation adjuster / polarisation controller 140 and then an interferometer 160. At the input to the interferometer a PBS splits each received pulse into orthogonal polarisation components (|Vn>, |Hn>). One arm of the interferometer includes a delay element which delays one of the polarisation components sufficiently to enable interference between two pulses of the pair. The interferometer outputs an interference pulse with a polarisation state 166 which is dependent on a phase difference ϕ1 between the input pulses. Different polarisation states can be coded by setting different phase differences ϕ1 , ϕ2 between input pulse pairs. The invention may be applied to quantum key distribution (QKD). Preferably a sequence of pulses is input to the interferometer. The pulses are preferably generated by injection locking a first laser diode 121 (which controls the phase difference between consecutive pulses) to a second laser diode 123, via a circulator 125.
Resumen de: EP4765723A1
0001 A quantum key distribution control apparatus according to an embodiment may perform operations of: acquiring, from a first node belonging to a first node group managed by the quantum key distribution control apparatus, a request for quantum key distribution to a second node belonging to a second node group; acquiring information about an external quantum key distribution control apparatus for managing the second node; determining, within the first node group, a third node connectable to the second node; generating a first quantum key between the second node and the third node by requesting the external quantum key distribution control apparatus for quantum key distribution between the second node and the third node; moving a mobile node belonging to the first node group to the position of the third node to control generation of a first combined key in which the first quantum key is combined with a second quantum key between the mobile node and the third node; and moving the mobile node to the position of the first node to control generation of a second combined key in which the first combined key is combined with a third quantum key between the first node and the third node.
Resumen de: EP4765717A1
According to an arrangement, a key management device (20) includes a generation unit (203), a packet processing unit (207), and an inter-node relay unit (209). The generation unit (203) is configured to generate a first global key based on a first random number. The packet processing unit (207) is configured to add, to a first packet including the first global key, first path information indicating a relay path for the first packet. The inter-node relay unit (209) is configured to encrypt the first packet with a local key shared with a different node and transmit the encrypted first packet to the different node.
Nº publicación: EP4765722A1 24/06/2026
Solicitante:
ID QUANTIQUE S A [CH]
ID Quantique S.A.
Resumen de: EP4765722A1
0001 The present invention relates to a quantum key distribution receiver comprising a unique single detector adapted to detect qubits composed of low power optical pulses in specified time-bins, A being the Advanced time-bin and D being the Delayed time-bin, an interferometer with two unequal arms, one short arm (S) and one long arm (L) adapted to create an interference between the two successive time-bins A and D so as to create three time bins AS, AL&DS, DL, characterized in that said receiver is adapted to control the single detector so as to work in a gated mode, where he chooses when the detector is active and when it is not and to choose in which basis he will measure, such that for each qubit received and interfered by said interferometer, said receiver is adapted to activate its single detector for the DL and AS bins to measure in the Z basis, or to activate it for the AL&DS bin to measure in the X basis.